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Abstract
My dissertation studies economics of innovation and industrial organi-
zation. In the first chapter, I analyze the effect of geographic proximity on
knowledge flows by estimating the impact of travel time on patent citation
frequency between US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) for the period
of 1976 to 2006. The variation in travel time comes from airlines’ entry
and exit. Using a gravity model, I show that on average a 1% reduction in
travel time leads to a 0.17% increase in patent citations. The intuition is
that faster travel facilitates face-to-face meetings, leading to more learning
opportunities. My results are robust when I take into account various types
of endogenous shocks.
The second chapter introduces two modifications to standard models
of media markets with advertisers on one side and readers/viewers on the
other. In the first modification, advertisers make strategic choices on the
quality of their ads which affect the utility of readers/viewers joining the
same platform. I show that this feature of strategic agents leads to quali-
tatively different econometric specifications for the estimation of group ex-
ternality parameters. Relative to benchmark case of passive agents, prices
on both sides are lower under strategic agents, benefiting the agents at the
cost of platforms. In the other modification, I introduce independent retail-
ers between platforms and readers/viewers. Our results suggest that this
modification has no impact on estimating the group externality parameters.
However, equilibrium price on either side depends on group externality pa-
rameters at both sides. This is in sharp contrast to standard results where
prices on one side depend only on group externality parameter of the other
ix
side. In the special case where each platform is split into two independent
divisions, I find that equilibrium price is the same across all four divisions,
and this common price depends on the product of the group externality
parameters of the two sides.
The third studies the impacts of innovations from upstream and down-
stream industries. Using input-output account and patent citation data,
I identify vertical relations between industries in both intermediate good
markets and the patent system. My results show that in intermediate good
markets, a 1% increase in research and development (R&D) expenditures
in upstream industries will decrease a downstream firm’s R&D expenditure
by 0.729%, while a 1% increase in R&D of the downstream will reduce a
upstream firm’s market value by 0.907%. Meanwhile, in the patent sys-
tem, the upstream to downstream R&D and market value elasticities are
estimated to be 0.983 and 1.053.
x
Chapter 1
Learning by Meeting: Assessing the Impact of Travel
Time on Patent Citations
1.1 Introduction
The study of industrial agglomeration dates back to Marshall (1890), who
explains several reasons why firms are geographically concentrated, one of
which is that firms located in industrial clusters can easily learn from the
firms nearby, indicating an positive correlation between geographic prox-
imity and knowledge flows. Jaffe et al. (1993) are the first to use patent
citations as a proxy for knowledge spillovers and show empirical evidence
supporting Marshall’s claim. Using a matching strategy, they find pairs
of patents with a citation link are more likely to be applied in the same
country, state or metropolitan area.
Although numerous subsequent studies using the same methodology ob-
tain similar results (Almeida and Kogut, 1997, 1999; Hicks et al., 2001;
Sonn and Storper, 2008), we still have little knowledge about the causal
relationship between geographic proximity and knowledge flows. One ques-
tion people might ask is: do knowledge flows happen more frequently when
1
firms are physically close to one another to begin with? The question is
difficult to answer because some unobserved factors might cause two firms
to co-locate and cite each other. For example, Thompson and Fox-Kean
(2005) find that localization of patent citations somewhat disappears after
they further require that patents in the control group and the treatment
group are from the same technology subclass.
In this article I study how geographic proximity affects knowledge flows
from a different perspective. I examine the impact of travel time on patent
citation frequency between two US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs).
In particular, I construct a unique panel dataset that links inter-MSA travel
time to their patent citations. There are several benefits from this strat-
egy. First, since travel time varies over time (while physical distance does
not), it allows me to estimate a fixed-effect model to account for any time-
invariant unobservables at MSA-pair level. Second, the variation of travel
time between MSAs is from airlines’ route choices, which can be considered
as external forces that bring a few firms closer to one another, which miti-
gates concerns associated with firms’ endogenous co-localization decisions.
Moreover, it allows me to look into some special cases in which travel time
reductions are due to some events that are arguably exogenous to patent
citations, such as the opening of a new airline hub. Lastly, Giroud (2013)
argues that travel time is a better proxy for geographic proximity than phys-
ical distance is, because it is possible that two cities are physically close,
but traveling between them involves a long road trip because there is no
direct flight.
Another novelty about this paper is that I adopt the gravity model from
2
the international trade literature. The motivation is that trade is similar
to knowledge flows in a sense that they are both examples of economic
interactions that are negatively correlated with distance. Nonetheless, this
article deviates from a traditional gravity model in that it utilizes the time-
varying nature of travel time to conduct a panel analysis.
My results show that travel time has a negative impact on inter-MSA
patent citation frequency. On average a 1% reduction in travel time in-
creases citation frequency between two MSAs by 0.17%. The intuition is
that faster travel makes business interactions more convenient and there-
fore facilitates face-to-face meetings, leading to more opportunities of knowl-
edge spillovers. Arvey (2009) argues that face-to-face meetings allow people
to capture verbal and non-verbal behavioral styles typically not observed
on telecommunications equipment, which sometimes can result in break-
through thinking.
Next, I explore if there exists a non-log-linear relationship between travel
time and patent citations, because in reality travelers are indifferent toward
travel time reductions that only save them a little time. For this issue, I
consider reductions in travel time as treatments, and divide the treatments
into several groups, each corresponding to a certain amount of travel time
reduction. I find the impacts are significant only when travel time reduc-
tions are greater than one hour.
It is possible, however, that sometimes airlines’ entry and exit are en-
dogenous to patent citations. For instance, suppose an airline started to
operate a new direct flight route between MSA i and j in year t, which
reduced the travel time, and we observed an increase in citation frequency
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between the two MSAs afterwards. I would like to attribute the increase in
patent citations to the reduction in travel time, but there is an alternative
story: there might be a time-varying unobserved shock, say αijt, that affects
both airlines’ route choices and patent citations. For robustness checks, I
first assume the unobserved shock, αijt, can be decomposed into αit and
αjt. This happens when there are two separate shocks to MSA i and j. I
find my results don’t change much when I control for those types of shocks
in my specification.
What if αijt cannot be decomposed? αijt cannot be decomposed if the
shock is due to some interactions between two MSAs. An example could be
the following: a large firm in MSA i recently acquired another large firm in
MSA j, which resulted in an increase in patent citations between the two
MSAs. Meanwhile, the firms’ lobbyists successfully convinced an airline
to start operating direct flights between the two MSAs. For this type of
shock, I examine the cases in which reductions in travel time are due to
the opening of a new hub. Arguably it is unlikely that a non-decomposable
endogenous shock to the patent citations between some MSA pairs such as
a merger and acquisition is strong enough to trigger a hub opening. I find
the impacts of travel time reductions due to hub openings are all positive
and statistically significant in my results.
Lastly, I check if there exists a reverse causality problem. It is likely that
airlines are more willing to operate a new flight route after they observe a
lot of patent citations between two MSAs. I argue that if this is the case,
then we should see a correlation between current patent citations and future
travel time reductions, because there is on average a two-year gap between
4
the time a patent is applied (the time it makes citations) and the time
the patent is granted (the time its information becomes publicly accessible
and airline carriers observe the citations). I perform the robustness check
by including future travel time reductions as explanatory variables in my
specification. I find the coefficients on future travel time reductions are all
small and insignificant.
Next, I show that the impacts of travel time are heterogeneous across
technology fields, with the impacts being the strongest on citations within
Chemical patents, and insignificant on citations within Drugs & Medical
patents. This can be due to the fact that knowledge in Drugs & Medi-
cal patents (such as compound formulas) is more self-evident than other
technology fields. Besides that, I don’t find evidence that the impacts are
heterogeneous over different time periods.
I don’t directly test Marshall’s theory, which hints at within-region
knowledge spillovers. That being said, my study still has important pol-
icy implications on air transportation infrastructure, innovation, and re-
gional economic development. It shows that there are empirically undocu-
mented positive externalities of transportation infrastructure on knowledge
spillovers across regions.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews
the related literature. Section 1.3 discusses the empirical methodology,
followed by Section 1.4, in which I describe the data. Results are presented
in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 performs multiple robustness checks and Section
1.7 discusses several extensions. Section 1.8 concludes.
5
1.2 Related Literature
Due to the non-rival property of knowledge, a few firms conducting R&D
activities will benefit other firms unintentionally, which results in positive
externalities. Since the seminal work of Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962),
the extent to which private investments in research and development create
knowledge spillovers has generated an extensive body of literature.
What receives much less attention is the factors determining knowl-
edge spillovers. What makes them happen? A challenge encountered by
researchers is that knowledge flows are invisible. Krugman (1991) claims
that it would be really hard to measure knowledge flows as they “leave no
paper trail”.
Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993, hereafter JTH) are the first to
solve the problem by using patent citations as a proxy for knowledge flows.
For a patent to be granted in the US, inventors are required by law to report
any known prior art by citing the relevant patents. If Patent A cites Patent
B, it means the inventor of patent A probably received some knowledge from
patent B. In their path-breaking study on the geographic localization of
knowledge flows, JTH construct three sets of patents: 1) a set of originating
patents; 2) a set of patents citing the originating patents; 3) and a set of
control patents that are similar to the set of citing patents in that they are
from the same technology class and are applied in the same year, except
that they don’t cite the originating patents. They compare the probability
that a citing patent matches the originating patent geographically (they
come from the region), with the probability that a non-citing control patent
matches the originating patent geographically. JTH find that patent pairs
6
with a citation link are more likely to come from the same country, state
or metropolitan area.
JTH’s novel empirical strategy is widely applied in the subsequent liter-
ature. Almeida and Kogut (1997) find that patent citations of small firms
are more geographically localized than large firms in the semiconductor
industry. Almeida and Kogut (1999) show evidence that geographic local-
ization of patent citations varies across regions and ideas are transmitted
through labor markets by the inter-firm mobility of engineers. Hicks et al.
(2001) conclude that patents assigned to US companies are more likely to
cite research papers produced by the nearby public universities. Sonn and
Storper (2008) show that localization of knowledge spillovers has been in-
creasing over time.
Nevertheless, to my best knowledge almost all of the studies in the
related literature are cross-sectional, making causal inference difficult. Any
unobserved common shock to both firms’ locality and their citations can
compromise the validity of empirical results. Due to the constraint of patent
data, the control variables used in most studies are primary technology class
and application year, but many other factors might cause firms to cluster
and cite one another (for example, two firms may be in the same business
alliance).
Maurseth and Verspagen (2002) regress citation frequency among Eu-
ropean regions on their physical distance. They conclude that physical
distance has a negative impact on inter-regional citation frequency. Their
analysis has similar endogeneity issues: countries close to one another may
have similar unobserved characteristics (such as similar cultures and social
7
values), which is why we observe more citations.
Agrawal et al. (2016) find the the stock of highways in a state has positive
impact on its innovation activities and knowledge flows. While their study
sheds light on knowledge spillovers within a region, this paper focuses on
across regions.
This paper contributes to the literature in the following aspects. First,
unlike physical distance, travel time varies over time, which allows me
to estimate a MSA-pair fixed-effect model to take into account any time-
invariant MSA-pair heterogeneity. Second, the source of variation in travel
time is from airlines’ route choices, which can be considered as external
forces that bring a few MSAs closer to one another. It mitigates concerns
associated with firms’ endogenous co-localization. Moreover, it allows me
to look into some special cases that travel time reductions are due to some
events exogenous to patent citations, such as the opening of a new airline
hub.
1.3 Identification and Methodology








where Xij is the trade volume between country i and j, Yi and Yj are
the economy size of country i and j, Dij is the physical distance between i
and j, and εij is the error term. There is a tradition in the profession that
Equation 1.1 is estimated in log-form:
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lnXij = lnα0 + α1 lnYi + α2 lnYj + α3 lnDij + ln εij, (1.2)
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) point out that estimating Equation 1.2 using
OLS has two problems. First, in many datasets, εij is heteroskedastic.
Since E(ln εij) depends on the variance of εij, E(ln εij) is correlated with
other regressors in the presence of heteroskedasticity, which violates the
classical assumptions of OLS. Second, in many observations, Xij is zero,
which creates a problem when taking logarithm. Silva and Tenreyro (2006)
show that it is appropriate in this case to estimate Equation 1.2 with a
Poisson regression.
I follow their strategy and estimate a fixed-effect Poisson model. An-
other reason for doing this is that Poisson regression is a natural candidate
for estimating count data (patent citation frequency). Here I assume the
arrival rate of citation frequency from MSA i to MSA j in year t, λijt, is a
deterministic function,
ln(λijt) = αij + αt + β · ln(travelijt) + θ
′
Xijt, (1.3)
where αij and αt are MSA-pair fixed effects and year fixed effects re-
spectively, travelijt is the travel time between MSA i and MSA j in year
t,Xijt is a vector of control variables, and β is the parameter of interest.
The randomness of this specification comes from the Poisson distribution:
the probability of observing cijt, the citation frequency from from MSA i















t ln(pr(cijt)) will generate inconsistent
estimates of β due to the incidental parameters problem. Instead, I use
a conditional fixed-effect maximum likelihood estimator by Hausman et
al. (1984, here after HHG), in which MSA-pair dummies are dropped by
conditioning cijt on the sum of citation frequencies over time (
∑
t cijt).
Wooldridge (1999) proves that HHG’s conditional fixed-effect Poisson es-
timator is consistent whether the data is over-dispersed or under-dispersed,
as long as Equation 1.3 holds. He also proposes an estimator of var(β̂)
that is robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the dependent




Ideally, to calculate the travel time between two MSAs, we want to survey
some travelers and ask how much time they spent on the trips. In reality,
such data are missing for most MSA pairs. I follow the same steps as Giroud
(2013) to calculate travel time. I first assume travelers either drive or fly,
and they always pick the routes and means of transportation that minimize
travel time.
Specifically, to measure the travel time between MSA i and MSA j in
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year t, I first calculate the driving time between MSA i and MSA j using
HERE Maps. In Appendix A I provide details on how this driving time
is calculated. Driving time is used as travel time if it is faster than flying
between MSAs.
Next, I calculate the air travel time, which has three components: (1)
the driving time between MSA i and its corresponding airport; (2) the
driving time between MSA j and its corresponding airport; (3) the time it
takes to fly between the two airports.
(1) and (2) are calculated using HERE Maps. (3) is equal to the sum
of wait time at the origin airport, layover time (only for non-direct flights),
and flight time. Wait time and layover time are both assumed to be 1 hour.
Flight time data is from the T-100 Domestic Segment Database for period
of 1990-2006 and ER-586 for the period of 1976-1989, which include all
domestic flights.1 The flight time for each route is equal to “ramp-to-ramp
time”, which is defined as “the time computed from the moment an aircraft
first moves under its own power for purposes of flight, until it comes to rest
at the next point of landing”, according to the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics.
When an MSA is served by multiple airports, I search for the fastest
flight route and compute the air travel time. The travel time between MSA
i and MSA j equals either the air travel time or the driving time, whichever
is faster.




According to the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), a patent has
to be non-obvious, novel and useful. Once a patent is granted, a public
document is released with information about the patent. One section of
the document is ”reference cited”, which lists all the citations the patent
makes.
There have been disputes over the validity of using patent citations as
an indicator of knowledge flows. In fact, patent citations can be added
by the patent examiner, if she considers it necessary, or even influenced
by the law firms hired to file the patent (Wagner et al., 2014), but overall
patent citations are “noisy” but meaningful indicators of knowledge flows,
according to the surveys of inventors conducted by Jaffe et al. (2000). If
patent A cites patent B, it is likely that patent A’s inventor received some
sort of knowledge from patent B.
The patent data is from the NBER Patent Data Project, which is an up-
dated version of a older dataset constructed by Hall et al. (2001). It includes
all the patents granted by the USPTO from 1976 to 2006. For each patent,
I observe the patent identifier number, application date, grant date, cita-
tions and technology class. Hall et al. (2001) categorize all patents into six
technology classes: Chemical, Computers & Communication, Drugs & Med-
ical, Electrical & Electronics, Mechanical, and Others.2 I complement the
NBER’s patent data with another dataset constructed by Li et al. (2014),
which also records patent inventors’ addresses of residence(city, state, ZIP
2The category Others includes several sub-categories, including Agriculture, Hus-
bandry, Food, Amusement Devices, Apparel & Textile, Earth Working & Wells, Furni-
ture, House Fixtures, Heating, Pipes & Joints, Receptacles, and Miscellanenous-Others.
Note most of these sub-categories are technologically unrelated.
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code and coordinate).3 Finally, I keep all the utility patents applied by in-
ventors that reside in the contiguous 48 US states and District of Columbia.
Citation frequency between MSAs serves as a proxy for knowledge flows.
I use the Metropolitan Statistical Area defined by the Office of Management
and Budget in 2009 as my basic geographic unit. There are a total of 363
MSAs in the lower 48 states and District of Columbia. I assign each patent
in my sample to an MSA according to its inventor’s address. Finally, I
count patent citation frequency at the MSA-pair-year level to construct the
variable cijt, the number of citations made from MSA i to MSA j in year
t. For example, if patent A applied in Oklahoma City in 1995 cites patent
B applied in Boston, then I will add one to the citation frequency from
Oklahoma City to Boston in 1995. I use the application year rather than
the grant year of the citing patent, because the former better approximates
the time when knowledge flows take place. In practice, the construction of
cijt is further complicated by the fact that sometimes a patent has multiple
inventors residing in different MSAs. For this issue, I follow the same rule
as Sonn and Storper (2008): suppose patent A cites patent B, and patent
A has M inventors and patent B has N inventors, then each inventor pair
carries a fraction of 1/(M ·N) citations.
For example, suppose Patent A has three inventors, one living Dallas
and two living in Memphis, and patent B has two inventors, one living
in Seattle and the other living in Portland. The citation from Dallas to
Seattle equals 1/3 ∗ 1/2 = 1/6 and the citation from Dallas to Portland
equals 1/3 ∗ 1/2 = 1/6. The citation from Memphis to Seattle equals
3The matching of the two datasets performs well. Less than 0.01% observations in
the NBER patent data were not able to find a match in the dataset by Li et al. (2014)
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to 2/3 ∗ 1/2 = 1/3, and the citation from Memphis to Portland equals
2/3 ∗ 1/2 = 1/3. In total, they sum up to 1.4
I include log of patents applied in the citing MSAs (appit) and log of
patent stock in the cited MSAs (stkjt) as two of my control variables. The
reason is that MSAs where a lot of patents are applied in a year are more
likely to cite other MSAs, and MSAs with a large amount of patent stock
are more likely to be cited. These two variables control for the overall
innovation activities of the citing and cited MSAs.
For appit, I count the number of patents applied in the citing MSA i in
year t. For stkjt, I first count the number of patent granted in cited MSA
j by year t and then use a perpetual inventory method to calculate patent
stock with a depreciation rate of 15%. I use the grant year to calculate
stkjt, because only after a patent is granted, its information become publicly
accessible and the patent starts to receive citations (Mehta et al., 2010). The
same as cijt, when a patent has N inventors residing in different MSAs, each
inventor carries a share of 1/N . Finally, I add one to both variables before
taking the log to deal with the zeroes.
Another important control variable is the technological similarity of the
cited and citing MSAs. MSAs working on R&D in related fields are more
likely to cite one another. In the spirit of Jaffe (1988), I construct two
vectors, pit and qjt. pit = (p1it, p2it, p3it, p4it, p5it)
′
, where pcit is the share
of patents applied in category c (c = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) in the citing MSA i in
year t, and qjt = (q1it, q2it, q3it, q4it, q5it)
′
, where qcit is the share of patent
4This would mean that some observations of cijt are not integers. This is not a
problem, as Wooldridge (1999) shows that the conditional fixed-effect Poisson estimators
are consistent as long as the dependent variable is non-negative.
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stock in category c in cited MSA j. pit captures the technology structure
of the ongoing innovation activities of MSA i in year t, while qit captures
the technology structure of the historical innovation activities in MSA j by
year t. 5 Finally, the technological similarity between MSA i and MSA j in
year t is measured by the technological distance, dijt, the euclidean distance
between the two coordinates.
dijt =
√
Σ5c=1(pcit − qcit)2 (1.5)
Higher dijt means lower technological similarity, with dijt = 0 indicating
the best technological match. Unlike Jaffe (1988), this measure of technol-
ogy similarity captures the dynamic feature of patent citations. It means if
MSA i’s ongoing innovation activities are similar to the historical innova-
tion activities in MSA j, then patents in MSA i will cite patents in MSA j
more often.
1.4.3 Other control variables
I also control for the overall economic activities of MSAs. The variables I
use are per capita personal income and population, both of which are from
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Economic Accounts. Per
capita income is deflated in real term using 2009 US dollar.
5I don’t include the sixth category “Others” in constructing the vectors because MSAs
with the same share of Others patents can still have very different technological structure,
since the category Others is composed of various technologically unrelated sub-categories.
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1.4.4 Summary statistics
Figure 1 depicts the citation (cijt) trend over years. We see citations steadily
increase over years and peak in year 2002 at around 800,000. There is a
drastic drop after 2002, which can be explained with the following example:
my sample includes patents granted until 2006. For a patent granted in 2006
to make any citations in 2006, it has to be applied in 2006 as well (because
I use the application year of the citing patent as the citation year), which is
rare because there is on average a two-year gap between the time a patent
is applied and the time it is granted.
Table 1.1 presents the distribution of citation frequency over technol-
ogy fields. Most of the citations are within-category (both the citing and
cited patents are from the same category). Citations within Computers
& Communication ranks the first, accounting for 22.58% of the citations
in my sample, followed by Electrical & Electronics, and Drugs & Medical.
The most frequent across-category citations are made from Computers &
Communication patents to Electrical & Electronics patents.
Table 1.2 ranks citation frequency by MSA-pair. I find that the top
10 MSA-pairs are all large and populous MSAs, including some famous
national R&D centers, such as Silicon Valley and Boston’s Route 128 region.
Table 1.3 provides summary statistics. There are 363 MSAs and 31 years in
my sample, resulting in a total of 363∗362∗31 = 4, 073, 586 MSA-pair-year
observations. Inter-MSA citation frequency is over-dispersed with a mean of
1.548 and a standard deviation of 28.814. The average travel time between
MSAs is about 386 minutes. The average number of patents applied is 110
and the average patent stock is 566. MSAs in the sample have an average
16
Table 1.1: Citations across technology fields
Cited category Citing category Frequency Percentage
Comp. & Comm. Comp.s & Comm. 1,793,259 22.58%
Electrical Electrical 1,078,642 13.58%
Drugs & Medical Drugs & Medical 975,358 12.28%
Chemical Chemical 869,150 10.94%
Others Others 673,606 8.48%
Mechanical Mechanical 551,708 6.95%
Electrical Comp. & Comm. 198,897 2.50%
Comp. & Comm. Electrical 148,067 1.86%
Chemical Drugs & Medical 133,700 1.68%
Chemical Others 123,972 1.56%
The rest 1,395,843 17.58%
Total 7,942,202 100%
This table shows the distribution of citations across technology fields. Patent cate-
gories are defined by (Hall et al., 2001). The category “Others” includes Agriculture,
Husbandry, Food, Amusement Devices, Apparel & Textile, Earth Working & Wells,
Furniture, House Fixtures, Heating, Pipes & Joints, Receptacles, and Miscellanenous-
Others.
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population of 581,726 and an average per capita income of $27,085.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Impacts of travel time on citations
Main results are presented in Table 1.4. The dependent variable is inter-
MSA citation frequency, and the independent variable of interest is log of
travel time. All the regressions in this table include log of patents applied
in the citing MSA, log of patent stock in the cited MSA, and technological
distance as control variables. The coefficients on the variables in log-form
can be interpreted as elasticities. In column (1), no fixed effects are used.
It is estimated that a 1% reduction in travel time is associated with an
0.35% increase in citation frequency. The elasticities of patents applied
and patent stock are all greater than one and statistically significant. The
coefficient on technological distance is negative and significant, which is
within my expectation as higher technological distance corresponds to lower
technological similarity.
In column (2), I additionally control for MSA-pair fixed effects and year
fixed effects. The results change a lot compared to column (1), indicat-
ing potential endogeneity issues in the previous specification. The magni-
tude of the elasticity of travel time decreased drastically to 0.194, but it
is still highly statistically significant at 1% level. Moreover, the elasticity
of patents applied remains similar to column (1), but the coefficient on
patent stock decreased significantly (from 1.055 to 0.625). The coefficient

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Citation frequency 1.548 28.814 0 10,865
Travel time 385.769 119.6565 18 2,542
Patents applied 110.334 368.364 0 7,225
Patent stock 566 1,856 0 33,789
Technology distance 0.427 0.204 0 1.414
Population 581,726 1,390,271 8172 19,253,644
Per capita income 27,085 6,922 10,659 87,477
The construction of all the variables in this table is discussed in Section 4. Travel
time (one-way) is in minutes. Per capita income is deflated using 2009 dollar.
A key issue in column (2) is that I don’t take into account the overall
economic activities of the MSAs. In column (3), I include population and
per capita income of both citing and cited MSAs in my regression. I found
the coefficients on travel time, patents applied, patent stock and technolog-
ical distance are similar to those of column (2). Looking at the coefficients
on MSA population and income, the elasticities of cited MSA population
and income are all significant and positive. This is within my expectation,
as larger or wealthier MSAs generally have more high-quality patents and
more business travelers. The elasticities of citing MSA population and in-
come are all insignificant. This seems counterintuitive because we expect
larger MSAs to cite more for the same reason as above. A possible expla-
nation is that larger firms, typically located in populous MSAs, tend to be
less research-active than startups (Almeida and Kogut, 1997; Breitzman,
2013).
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Table 1.4: Impacts of travel time on citations
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Travel time -0.353*** -0.194*** -0.172*** -0.166***
(0.019) (0.043) (0.044) (0.041)
Patents applied 1.041*** 1.018*** 1.015*** 0.759***
(0.003) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
Patent stock 1.055*** 0.625*** 0.561*** 0.528***
(0.003) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020)
Tech distance -1.622*** -0.938*** -0.926*** -1.024***
(0.030) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039)
Cited MSA income 0.336*** 0.290***
(0.080) (0.078)
Cited MSA pop. 0.437*** 0.309***
(0.071) (0.076)
Citing MSA income -0.023 0.047
(0.071) (0.067)






fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -3152478.9 -1616280.8 -1615163.9 -1600267.5
N 4,073,586 4,073,586 4,073,586 4,073,586
Standard errors in parentheses.* (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001). The
dependent variable is citation frequency between MSAs.
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1.5.2 Non-log-linear relationship between travel time
and patent citations
The gravity model assumes a log-linear relationship between travel time and
patent citations. What if the impacts are not log-linear? In reality trav-
elers are generally indifferent toward travel time reductions that only save
them a couple minutes. To explore this possibility, I write an alternative
specification,





where I replace travel time with trtijt, a vectors of treatments, with
each element equal to one if (one-way) travel time between MSA i and j is
reduced by a certain amount by year t.6 Specifically, I categorize travel time
reductions into five groups in Table 1.5: 0-15 minutes, 15-30 minutes, 30-60
minutes, 60-120 minutes, and more than 120 minutes. Results are presented
in Table 1.5. I find the impact of 0-15 minutes’ reduction in travel time is
small and insignificant. The impacts become marginally insignificant when
reductions in travel time gradually increase from 15 minutes to 60 minutes,
and finally become significant when reductions are greater than one hour.
It is estimated that a 60-120 minutes’ reduction in travel time will increase
citations by 9.2%, while a more-than-two-hour reduction leads to a 28.4%
increase in patent citations.
6Appendix B provides details on the construction of trtijt.
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more than 120 minutes 0.284***
(0.073)
Patents applied (log) 1.015***
(0.012)




MSA-pair fixed effects and year fixed effects Yes
Log likelihood -1615278.7
Number of observations 4,073,586
Standard errors in parentheses.* (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), ***
(p < 0.001). The depedent variable is citation frequency between




The source of variation in travel time in my data comes from changes in
airlines’ route choices. There is a potential endogeneity problem. For exam-
ple, suppose an airline started to operate a new direct flight route between
MSA i and j in year t, which reduced the travel time, and we observe an
increase in citation frequency between MSA i and j afterwards. This could
be because there is an unobserved endogenous shock, say αijt, that affects
both airlines’ route choices and patent citations. In this section, I perform
several robustness checks to address these concerns.
1.6.1 Decomposable endogeneous shocks
One possibility is that αijt can presumably be decomposed into αit and
αjt. This happens when there are two separate shocks to MSA i and j.
The most straightforward solution is to include αit and αjt as dummies
in my specification. Unfortunately, that would mean including additional
363 MSAs × 31 years × 2 = 22506 dummies in my regression. Even the
best computing power available today can’t handle this. To bypass this
problem, I introduce two variables, ωit and ωjt, where ωit = 1/362
∑363
s 6=j cist,
the average citations that MSA i (the citing MSA) makes to other MSAs
(excluding MSA j) in year t, and ωjt = 1/362
∑363
s 6=i csjt, the average citations
that MSA j (the cited MSA) receives from other MSAs (excluding MSA
i) in year t. The idea is that if there is a positive shock to αit, then it
should not only increase cijt, the citations MSA i makes to MSA j, but
also increases cist(s 6= j), the citations MSA i makes to other MSAs, since
αist = αit + αst by construction. Therefore, a shock to αit can be taken
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into account by controlling for the average citations MSA i makes to other
MSAs, and similarly, a shock to αjt can be traced by controlling for the
average citations MSA j receives from other MSAs.
In column (4) of Table 1.4, I present results with ωit and ωjt included
as controls. The coefficient on travel time is similar compared to column
(3). Besides, the coefficients on ωit and ωjt are positive and statistically
significant.
1.6.2 Non-decomposable endogeneous shocks
What if αijt is non-decomposable? This happens when the endogenous
shock is the result of some interactions between the two MSAs. For exam-
ple, a large firm in MSA i recently acquired another large firm in MSA j,
which resulted in an increase in patent citations between the two MSAs.
Meanwhile, the firms’ lobbyists successfully convinced an airline to start
operating direct flights between the two MSAs. For this type of shock, I
examine the cases in which reductions in travel time are due to the opening
of a new hub. Giroud (2013) is the first to use hub openings as an exoge-
nous source of variation in travel time. Similar to his argument, it is less
likely that a non-decomposable endogenous shock, such as a merger and
acquisition, is strong enough to trigger a hub opening. Here I consider the
following specification,
ln(λijt) = αij + αt + β · hubtrtijt + θ
′
Xijt (1.7)
hubtrtijt equals 1 if travel time is reduced by more than one hour due
to the opening of a new hub, and 0 otherwise. If the results I get in the
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previous sections are due to some non-decomposable endogenous shock αijt,
then my estimate of β should be insignificant, since hubtrtijt is uncorrelated
with a non-decomposable αijt. In Table 1.6, I represent the results. The
control variables are identical to those of column (4) of Table 1.4, in which
both ωit and ωjt are included. The coefficient of hubtrtijt is positive and
significant at 1% level.




Patents applied (log) 0.759***
(0.015)




Average citations made (logωit) 0.336***
(0.013)
Average citations received (logωjt) 0.080***
(0.010)
MSA population and income Yes
MSA-pair and year fixed effects Yes
Log likelihood -1600407.6
Number of observations 4,073,586
Standard errors in parentheses.* (p < 0.05), ** (p <
0.01), *** (p < 0.001). Coefficients on MSA population
and income are available upon request.
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1.6.3 Simultaneity
The above robustness checks don’t rule out the possibility of reverse causal-
ity. Suppose the citations from MSA i to MSA j increase in year t. Seeing
there is a demand for knowledge flows, airlines decide to operate a direct
flight between the two MSAs. I argue that if this is the case, there should be
a correlation between current patent citations and future travel time reduc-
tions. The reason is the following. By construction, my dependent variable
cijt, citations from MSA i to MSA j in year t are the citations made by
patents applied in year t. A patent’s information is publicly accessible only
after it is granted and the grant process typically takes two years, which
means if there is a positive shock to cijt, airlines should normally observe
it two years later on average.
In Table 1.7, I test such claim by including both past and future travel
time reductions in my specification. The dummies equal one if travel time
was reduced by more than one hour in year t±s and the dependent variable
is cijt, citations in year t. In column (1), I first add past travel time reduc-
tions. I find that reductions in travel time in year t increase citations in
the same year by 5.8%. The impacts become stronger a year later and peak
at 11.1% two years later. After two years, the impacts gradually diminish.
In column (2), I additionally include future time reductions as explanatory
variables, travel time reductions in year t + 1 and t + 2. All coefficients
on future time reductions are insignificant while the coefficients on past
reductions remain similar to column (1).
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Table 1.7: Impacts of lags and leads of travel time on citations
Variable (1) (2)
Travel time reduction (t+ 2) -0.011
(0.019)
Travel time reduction (t+ 1) 0.022
(0.026)
Travel time reduction (t) 0.058** 0.061**
(0.023) (0.027)
Travel time reduction (t− 1) 0.084*** 0.086***
(0.028) (0.032)
Travel time reduction (t− 2) 0.111*** 0.114***
(0.031) (0.035)
Travel time reduction (t− 3) 0.099*** 0.101***
(0.030) (0.032)
Travel time reduction (t− 4) 0.083*** 0.085***
(0.027) (0.030)
Travel time reduction (+4 yrs ago) 0.064*** 0.066***
(0.024) (0.027)
Log likelihood -1615119.4 -1615113.4
Number of observations 3,679,368 3,416,556
Standard errors in parentheses.* (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001).
All regressions control for patents applied in the citing MSA, patent stock
in the cited MSA, population and income of both citing and cited MSAs,
MSA-pair fixed effects, and year fixed effects
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1.7 Extensions
1.7.1 Heterogeneous impacts of travel time across tech-
nology fields
Are the impacts different across technology fields? In column (1) to (6)
of Table 1.8, I present results when the dependent variables are citations
within certain technology fields, that is, both the citing and cited patent
come from the same patent category. Looking at column (1) to (5), the
impact is the strongest within Chemical category at -0.45, followed by
Mechanical, Electrical & Electronics, and Computers & Communication.
Surprisingly, the impact within Drugs and Medical category is insignifi-
cant. This can be due to the fact that the knowledge in drugs and medical
patents (such as compound formulas) is more self-evident than other indus-
tries. In column (6), the dependent variable is the citations whose citing
and cited patents are from the same category, the sum of the dependent
variables from column (1) to (5). I find that on average a 1% reduction in
travel time will increase within-category citations by 0.23%. In column (7),
the dependent variable is citations across categories. The elasticity of travel
time is smaller compared to column (6). It is estimated that a 1% reduction
in travel time leads to a 0.12% increase in citation frequency across patent
categories.
1.7.2 Early years vs. later years
It is natural to expect the impacts of travel time reductions to be stronger in























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































makes remote business cooperation much easier. To test such claim, based
on Equation 1.3, I interact ln(travelijt) with a set of four dummies, each
corresponding to a different time period (1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s).
The impacts of travel time reductions seem to be decreasing starting from
1970s to 1990s and bounce back a little in the 2000s. However, if I pick
any two of the four coefficients and perform a t-test, none of them are
statistically different at 10% level. Therefore, I don’t have evidence that
the impacts of travel time are heterogeneous over time.
1.8 Conclusion
The claim that geographic proximity facilitates knowledge flows has been
found in many contexts. However, most of the evidence in the literature
comes from cross-sectional studies, in which endogeneity problems are in-
evitable. Any unobserved common shock to firms’ locality and knowledge
flows makes empirical results hard to trust. In this paper, I attempt to
address this issue by studying the effects of changes in travel time on inter-
MSA patent citations. I find that reductions in travel time have positive
impacts on inter-regional patent citation frequency. Besides that, I also find
travelers are indifferent toward travel time reductions that save them less
than one hour, and the impacts of travel time reductions are the strongest
two years later. Most importantly, my results are robust when I control
for various types of endogenous shocks, when I examine travel time reduc-
tions due to hub openings, and when I examine the dynamic impacts of
travel time reductions. Finally, I find the impacts are heterogeneous across
technology fields, with the impacts being the strongest on citations within
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Table 1.9: Earlier years vs. later years
Variable (1)
Travel time (log) * 1970s dummy -0.200***
(0.046)
Travel time (log) * 1980s dummy -0.174***
(0.043)
Travel time (log) * 1990s dummy -0.155***
(0.041)
Travel time (log) * 2000s dummy -0.179***
(0.042)
Patents applied (log) 0.758***
(0.015)





Number of observations 4,073,586
Standard errors in parentheses.* (p < 0.05), ** (p <
0.01), *** (p < 0.001). Coefficients on MSA population
and per capita income are available upon request.
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Chemical patents and the weakest within Drug & Medical patents.
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Chapter 2
Strategic Agents and Vertical Relationships in Media
Markets
2.1 Introduction
Two-sided markets have attracted increasing attention among economists.
In a two-sided market, platforms serve two (or multiple) sides, and the
utility of an agent joining a platform depends on how many agents on the
other side join the same platform. The most studied two-sided markets are
probably media markets where the group externality is negative on one side
but positive on the other side. For example, in the case of TV (magazine)
markets, the two sides of agents are viewers (readers) and advertisers. For
advertisers, the value of placing an ad increases when the TV program or
magazine reaches more readers (viewers). In contrast, it is often assumed
that ads lead to nuisance cost for viewers (readers), so having more adver-
tisers on the same platform lowers their utility.
Earlier studies on two-sided markets have analyzed various pricing issues
(fixed fee vs per-unit price, free vs. paid etc.) and market features (single-
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homing vs. multi-homing).1 There are two common assumptions in these
studies. First, all agents are passive in the sense that their only decision is
which platform(s) to join (participation decision). Second, platforms serve
the agents directly (no middleman). Both assumptions may be violated in
practice. In media markets, advertisers typically are not passive, and need
to make strategic decisions such as choosing ad quality. This is because, ad-
vertisers are interested in not only how many readers will see their ads but
also how effective their ads will be in influencing sales. The success of ads
depend heavily on “the actual content of your commercial, the production
quality”.2 And production quality comes at a cost. According to Chron,
production costs of a 30-second commerical in 2008 range in price from
free, to $200-$1,500 produced by local television statsions, to $342,000 on
average produced by an advertising agency for national commercial.3 Sec-
ond, platforms may not directly sell to the agents. For example, magazines
may be sold to retailers first, who then resell the magazines to final readers.
Similarly, ESPN sells its content to cable providers who as middlemen then
sell to viewers.
In this paper, we first consider the case of strategic agents (e.g., adver-
tisers who make strategic decisions such as ad quality). We identify two
complications if the strategic feature of advertisers is ignored. First, wrong
estimates of group externality parameters will be obtained. Advertisers’
1See, for example, Caillaud and Jullien (2003); Armstrong (2006) and Choi (2006).
2“How Much Does TV Commercial Production Cost?”, Kelly McCaughey, August 8,
2016, http://www.greyskyfilms.com/tv-commercial-production-cost/. Accessed on Jan-
uary 25, 2017.
3“How Much Does Television Advertising Really Cost?,” by Nancy Wagner,
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/much-television-advertising-really-cost-58718.html. Ac-
cessed on January 25, 2017.
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optimal ad quality choice depends on the anticipated market share of the
platform on the reader side. Once this is taken into account, the econo-
metric model will differ qualitatively from the one under passive agents.
Therefore, the passive agents model will lead to model specification errors,
and in turn wrong estimates.
Second, the equilibrium prices will differ. In particular, prices on both
sides of the market will be upward biased so taking into account the strate-
gic feature of advertisers lowers equilibrium prices on both sides. On the
reader side, competition is now more intense – more readers affect adver-
tiser utility not only directly, but also indirectly through its impact on ad
quality. Price must be lower with more intense competition. On the adver-
tiser side, endogenous ad quality essentially reduces the magnitude of group
externality parameter on the advertiser side. Since this group externality
parameter is negative, it raises equilibrium prices. Correspondingly, a re-
duction in the magnitude of group externality parameter leads to a smaller
increase of price, relative to the case of passive agents.
We also analyze the case of vertical relationship where there are middle-
men between platforms and agents on the reader side.4 That is, platforms
sell to (dedicated) retailers at wholesale prices, and retailers then sell to
readers at retail prices. Our results show that ignoring this vertical struc-
ture has no impact on estimating the group externality parameters. In
particular, even if one uses wholesale prices rather than retail prices on the
4Many two-sided markets have middlemen. In our setting, readers may buy magazines
from a retailer rather than the publisher (manufacturer) directly. In terms of credit cards,
a consumer typically receives credit card from an issuer rather than a credit card agency.
For example, consumers may receive Visa cards not from Visa, but from airlines, banks
or hotels etc.
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reader side, one can still obtain the correct group externality parameters.
We also solve for equilibrium prices and find that in general equilibrium
price on either side depends on both sides’ group externality parameters.
This is in sharp contrast to findings in standard two-sided market models
where equilibrium price on either side depends on the group externality on
the other side only. Interestingly, we consider the case where each platform
is split into two independent divisions who maximizes its own profit. We
find that the two sides would command the same equilibrium price, which
involves the product of the group externality parameters of both sides.
To our knowledge this is the first paper concerned with these two mod-
ifications of strategic agents and vertical relationship. For example, in two
of the most influential papers on two-sided markets, Caillaud and Jullien
(2003) and Armstrong (2006), platforms are allowed to choose different
prices across groups but not within a group, similar to our paper. They
do not consider strategic agents or vertical relationship, but analyze issues
such as single-homing vs. multi-homing.
Our paper is most closely related to the literature estimating two-sided
market models. Most look at media markets where one of the two sides
is advertisers,. For example, see Kaiser and Wright (2006) and Kaiser
and Song (2009) for magazine market, Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007)
for newspaper market and Wilbur (2008) for TV advertising.5 Kaiser and
Wright use a model similar to Armstrong (2006) with two platforms and
5There are also earlier studies estimating networks effects, for example, Rysman
(2004). There, advertisers choose the size of their ad. But this is more like the platform
chooses multiple qualities (versions) or their product and let the advertisers self-select.
This is qualitatively different from our strategic agent case where advertisers determine
how much to invest in making their ad, choosing ad quality.
37
specific consumer distribution (Hotelling model). They adapt the model
and derive the demand on both sides of market. They also construct vari-
ous instrument variables to deal with endogeneity issues. Our benchmark
model largely follows that in Kaiser and Wright with some simplification
(see Section 2.2 for more details). Our focus is on the two modifications of
strategic agents and vertical relationship, and how they affect estimation
and comparative statics. Neither of the aforementioned studies considers
any of these two modifications.
There are also various theory studies analyzing media markets. See,
for example, Anderson and Coate (2005), Kind et al. (2007) and Reisinger
(2012). Similar to the empirical literature mentioned above, in these stud-
ies, agents only make platform participation decisions (passive agents) and
platforms directly sell to agents (no middleman). Advertisers in our model
viewing the competing platforms as differentiated, but they all value con-
sumers the same. In contrast, in Athey et al. (2013), advertisers have
heterogeneous valuations for reaching consumers.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present and analyze
the benchmark model in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 considers the case of
strategic agents where agents on one side (advertisers) make investment
decisions which directly affect the utility level of readers joining the same
platform. In Section 2.4 we analyze a vertical structure where platforms
sell to middlemen (e.g. retailers) instead of selling to agents directly. We
conclude in Section 2.5. Proofs of lemmas and propositions can be found
6This is also assumed in various other studies. See Anderson and Jullien (2015) for
a survey of this literature. Note that while advertisers may have different valuations for
reaching viewers, each viewer values all advertisers the same. In contrasts, in our model,
a viewer values different ads differently, depending on the quality of these ads.
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in the appendix.
2.2 The benchmark model
Our benchmark model follows Kaiser and Wright (2006) closely. Two plat-
forms (e.g., magazines) i = 1, 2, are located at the two end points of a
Hotelling line with platform 1 located at 0. Platforms serve two groups
of agents: readers (denoted by superscript r) and advertisers (denoted by
superscript a). There is a continuum of each group of agents (with mass
1), uniformly distributed on the Hotelling line. Transport cost is linear in
distance traveled and unit transport cost t is the same for the two groups of
agents. We further assume t = 1
2
for simplicity. Consider a reader located
at x. If she joins platform 1, she enjoys a utility of
ur1 = θ




In the above expression, θr is the reservation value from consuming
the content provided by the platform. p1 is the price a reader has to pay
to joining platform 1 (e.g., buying a copy of its magazine). Na1 is the
number of advertisers who join platform 1. γ measures the externality of
ads on readers. We follow the common assumption γ ≤ 0 in the literature
studying media markets. That is, going through ads is a nuisance cost
which viewers/readers need to bear to access the content provided by the
platforms. εr1 captures a platform specific shock to all readers’ utility which
is unobserved with mean zero.
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If this reader joins platform 2 instead, her utility will be
ur2 = θ




Similarly, an advertiser located at x will have the following utilities
ua1 = θ









where θa is the reservation utility and the group externality parameter
is ρ > 0.
By looking at the uji expressions, i = 1, 2, j = a, r, we can see that for
agents on either side, only group externality parameter on the same side
enters into the utility function, and enters in a linear fashion. For example,
only ρ enters into the uai expressions and does so linearly.
The stage game we analyze is the following. In stage 1, platforms choose
prices pi and ai simultaneously. Observing these prices, readers and adver-
tisers choose which platform to join simultaneously in stage 2.
This is a simplified version of the model in Kaiser and Wright (2006),
with θji = θ
j, i = 1, 2, j ∈ {r, a}. We also assume that the coefficients in
front of ai and pi are 1 (marginal utility of income is normalized to 1). The
marginal advertiser xa, who is indifferent between joining either platform,
can be derived as
ua1 = u
a
2 ⇒ xa =
1
2
+ ρ(N r1 −N r2 )− (a1 − a2) + (εa1 − εa2). (2.1)
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The number of advertisers joining either platforms is given by
Na1 = x
a, Na2 = 1− xa.




+ γ(Na1 −Na2 )− (p1 − p2) + (εr1 − εr2), (2.2)
and
N r1 = x
r, N r2 = 1− xr.











. Since N ji + N
j
−i = 1 (unit mass of








+ γ(Na1 −Na2 )− (p1 − p2) + εr1 − εr2. (2.4)
With data on sales N ji , market share n
j
i and prices (pi and ai), these
two equations can be used to estimate group externality parameters ρ and
γ respectively.7
Equilibrium prices and comparative statics:
Setting εji = 0 (their mean value), platforms’ profit maximization prob-
7Prices and sales on the right hand side are likely to be endogenous. Kaiser and
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) are always −1 (similar to the results in Armstrong
(2006)).
All these results are straight from Kaiser and Wright (2006). Next, we
introduce two new modifications to the model, one at a time. First, we
allow agents on one side to make a strategic choice, which affects their own
utility as well as the utility of agents on the other side. Second, we allow
a vertical structure on one side with an intermediary between the platform
and the agents. For example the magazines may be sold to retailers first
which then sell the magazines to readers.
2.3 Strategic agents
The benchmark model assumes that all agents are passive, i.e., they only
determine which platform to join. What if some agents make strategic
42
decision (beyond the simple participation decisions), which in turn affect
the well being of agents on the other side and the platforms?
Consider advertisers for example. Suppose that in addition to platform
participation decisions, they also decide what types of ads to show to read-
ers on a platform. For simplicity, we characterize the type of ad with single
parameter κ ≥ 0 representing of the quality of ad, and advertisers’ strate-
gic decision becomes ad quality decision. Better quality ad benefits both
readers (e.g., more fun, less nuisance) and advertisers (e.g., attract more
attention from readers). But investment is also costly, entailing a fixed
investment cost of c(κ), where c′(κ) > 0 and c′′(κ) > 0. For tractabil-




With investment, a representative advertiser’s utility of joining platform
1 becomes
ua1 = θ








where f(ρ, κ,N r1 ) increases with ρ, κ and N
r
1 . For simplicity, we assume
that
f(ρ, κ,N r1 ) = ρ(1 + κ)N
r
1 .
Note that if the advertiser does not invest in ad quality (κ = 0), then
we recover the utility in the benchmark model. The advertiser’s utility of
joining either platform is,
ua1 = θ


















For either platform the advertiser joins, it chooses κ optimally to max-
imize uai . Solving
∂uai
∂κ
= 0, we obtain the results in the following Lemma.





i = 1, 2’s expected market share on the reader side.
Note that all advertisers joining the same platform will choose the same
investment level. Correspondingly, the average ad quality is also κi for
platform i.
2.3.1 Estimating group externality parameters
Having derived advertiser’s optimal investment decisions, next we investi-
gate how such investment decisions affect the estimation of group external-
ity parameters.
Substituting κ∗i = ρN
r
i into advertiser’s utility functions, we can obtain
ua1 = θ
a + ρN r1 + (ρN
r
1 )
























On the advertiser side, it remains that only the own group externality
parameter ρ enters into the utility function, except that it now enters in a
nonlinear fashion.
Similar to the benchmark model, we derive the marginal advertiser xa











2 − (N r2 )
2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
additional term







This seems different from equation (2.4) in the benchmark model. In
particular, advertiser demand now is linear-quadratic in ρN ri , rather than
just linear.8
Ad quality affects reader utility as well. This may be because read-
ers enjoy more an ad with higher quality, or a higher quality ad may be
more informative which allows readers to make better purchasing decisions.
Taking this into account, a representative reader’s utility becomes,
uri = θ
r + g(γ, κ̄i, N
a




where κ̄i is the average ad quality on platform i, and g(γ, κ̄i, N
a
i ) in-
creases with γ and κ̄i but decreases with N
a
i .
For simplicity, assume that
g(γ, κ̄i, N
a
i ) = γ(1− κ̄i)Nai , i = 1, 2.
Because all advertisers on the same platform make the same investment,
we have κ̄i = κ
∗
i . A representative reader’s utility of joining either platform
8This can also be seen with general f(ρ, κi, N
r
i ) and c(κ), since κ
∗ in general will be
a function of Nri . Once κ
∗
i is substituted, then n
a



















From equation (2.10), we can see that on the reader side, now group
externality parameters of both sides (ρ and γ) enter into their utility func-
tions. In particular, it contains the same linear term γNai , but also an
interaction term ργN ri N
a
i .
Using the new uri expressions, we can derive the marginal readers x
r and








+ γ(Na1 −Na2 )− γ · ρ · (N r1 ·Na1 −N r2 ·Na2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
additional term
−(p1 − p2) + εr1 − εr2. (2.11)
It is also different from (2.3) of the benchmark model. Combined with
the results for estimating ρ using advertisers’ side, we have the following
results.
Proposition 1. (Estimating group externality parameters) Ignoring adver-
tisers’ strategic investment decisions will lead to wrong econometric models
for estimating the group externality parameters on both the advertiser and
reader sides.
If the underlying model features strategic agents yet it is not modeled,
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then the consequent econometric models are likely to be wrong as we have
shown, leading to inaccurate estimates.
2.3.2 Equilibrium prices and comparative statics
Setting εji = 0, i = 1, 2, j = a, r, we can solve platforms’ FOCs and obtain
equilibrium prices and profits, as given in the next Proposition.
Proposition 2. (Strategic agents) When advertisers make strategic invest-






ρ(γ − ρ), ai =
1
2















ρ2, i = 1, 2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
























− 1 ∈ (−1, 0),
which lead to the following Corollary.
Corollary 1. (Strategic agents) Different from the benchmark case, with









) are not −1.
In standard two-sided markets, the own partial derivatives are always
zero and cross partial derivatives are always −1. This is not true anymore
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under strategic agents. Why? The answer lies in the different forms of
utility functions. First, note that ρ enters into uai expressions nonlinearly.
Second, both γ and ρ enters into the uri expressions.
9
We can also explore welfare impacts of strategic agents. The results are
summarized in the next Proposition.
Proposition 3. Relative to the benchmark case of passive agents, in the
strategic agents case:
(i) Equilibrium prices on both sides are lower;
(ii) Platforms are worse off while advertisers and readers are better off.
Proof. See the Appendix.
(i) can be easily verified and is rather counterintuitive. After all, adver-
tisers’ investment in ad quality helps themselves and readers. Let us see
why. When platforms choose prices on the reader side, there is more to
lose when advertisers are strategic – ρ affects uai not only directly, but also
indirectly by affecting advertiser investment. This gives each platform more
incentive to attract readers which intensifies competition at the reader side
and leads to lower prices. Prices on the advertisers side are determined by
group externality at the reader side. We can see it from reader’s utility
9To see this, we consider a hypothetical situation where advertiser’s ad quality af-
fects their own utilities but not readers’ utilities. We find the equilibrium prices to be
p1 = −1/2ρ2 − ρ + 1/2 and a1 = 1/2 − γ. Note that own derivatives are still zero,
since only group externality parameter of the same side enters into an agent’s utility















where γ̃ ≡ (1− κ∗1)γ. It look just like the ur1 except γ is replaced by γ̃.
Correspondingly, on the advertiser side, platforms will raise prices by |γ̃|.
Prices on the advertiser side are also lower than those in the benchmark
model since
|γ̃| = |(1− κ∗1)γ| =




With lower prices on both sides, platforms must be worse off. However,
advertisers and readers are better off because they both enjoy lower prices.
Additionally, advertisers can mimic the benchmark case by choosing zero
investment. The fact that they choose positive investment must make them
strictly better off. For readers, investment by advertisers directly raises their
utilities, everything else the same. Combined with lower prices, readers
must be better off as well.
To summarize, if the strategic agent aspect is ignored, we find that: (i)
Estimates of the group externality parameters will be biased; (ii) Equilib-
rium prices are upward biased, and their derivatives with respect to group
externality parameters differ; (iii) Platform profits are over-reported while
advertiser and reader surplus are under reported.
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2.4 Vertical relationship
In the previous section, the deviation from standard two-sided market mod-
els is strategic agents on one side. In this section, we go back to passive
agents who do not make strategic decisions. Instead, we introduce an ex-
tra layer on one side of the market. On the reader side, we assume that
platforms do not directly sell to readers, but rather through independent
retailers. In particular, there are two (dedicated) retailers, with retailer
i = 1, 2 serving platform i = 1, 2 only.10
Representative advertiser and reader’s utilities from joining either plat-
form are the same as in the benchmark model,
uai = θ




x and t2(x) =
1
2
(1− x). Note that retail prices are now
chosen by retailers, not platforms.
Let wi denote platform i’s wholesale price charged to retailer i. Retailer
i’s profit maximization problem is
max
pi
πRi = (pi − wi)N ri , i = 1, 2.
10There are alternative ways to model the retail sector. For example, there may be a
single retailer serving both platforms. Or there are may be two undedicated retailers,
each serving both platforms. The former case introduce double marginalization, but also
the problem of sharing a single downstream distribution. In the latter case, one will need
to introduce retailer differentiation on top of platform differentiation. Our specification
of two dedicated retailers introduces double marginalization only.
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i , i = 1, 2.
The stage game is as follows. In stage 1, platforms choose wholesale
prices (wi) simultaneously. In stage 2, retail prices on both sides (pi and ai)
are chosen simultaneously. In stage 3, readers and advertisers decide what
platforms to join.
2.4.1 Estimating group externality parameters
First note that the agents’ utility functions are the same as in the benchmark








+ γ(Na1 −Na2 )− (p1 − p2) + εr1 − εr2.
If one uses final retail prices (pi and ai), having a vertical structure
would have no impact on the correct estimation of the group externality
parameters γ and ρ.
We solve the game backwards, starting with stage 2 where platforms







Solving the retailers’ FOC, we can obtain pi(w1, w2). They lead to
11
p1 − p2 =
(8γ2 + 3)(w1 − w2)
9− 16γρ
. (2.12)
What if one uses wholesale prices (wi) instead of the retail prices (pi) on
the reader side to estimate γ? To see this, we substitute the pi expressions
as functions of w1 and w2, into the n
r








+ γ(Na1 −Na2 )−
(8γ2 + 3)(w1 − w2)
9− 16γρ
+ εr1 − εr2.
If one ignores the endogeneity of wholesale prices, then group externality
parameters can be correctly estimated even with wholesale prices.
2.4.2 Equilibrium prices and comparative statics
In the previous section, we have solved for the optimal pi from retailers’
FOCs. From platforms’ FOC, we can obtain ai(w1, w2). Substituting the
optimal pi and ai expressions into π
M
i , we can solve for the optimal wholesale
prices which can be substituted back to obtain the retail prices pi and ai.
The results are presented in the next Proposition.
Proposition 4. (Vertical structure) With retailers on the readers side,
equilibrium prices are given by:
wi =
9− 4ρ− 6γ − 16ργ
16γ2 + 6
, (2.13)
11More details are provided in Proof of Proposition 4.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
In the equilibrium, platforms will choose wi > 0. However, if we sub-
stitute wi = 0 into the optimal retail price functions, we get the same
retail prices as substituting wi = 0 into equations (2.14)-(2.15). That is,
pi = ai =
1
2
− 2 · ρ · γ. In this case, the platforms make profits from the
advertiser side only while independent retailers profit from the reader side
only. Platform and retailers maximize their own profits, and do not take
into account theirs impacts on the other side. This is the same as the case
where a platform splits itself into two independent divisions (presented in
the next Corollary), one for each side, and each division maximizes its own
profit. Thus we have the following results,
Corollary 2. (Independent division) If each platform is split into two inde-
pendent divisions, one for each side, then in the unique equilibrium, prices
are given by




In the standard two-sided markets, price on each side depends on the
other side’s group externality, not on its own side’s group externality. As a
result, price in the two sides differ from each other (pi 6= ai). In contrast,
under independent division, prices on the two sides are the same and depend




the profit of platform 1’s reader and advertiser division respectively,
πr1 = p1n
r, πa1 = a1n
a.
Their respectively FOCs are
∂πr1
∂p1



















In the equilibrium, nr = na = 1
2
. It must be that








In standard two-sided markets, platform 1 maximizes its joint profit

























The platform internalizes the impact of price change in one side on the
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profit from the other side (cross impacts), so the cross derivatives enter into











This leads to different prices at the two sides (pi 6= ai).12
Using the equilibrium prices in equations (2.14) and (2.15), one can
easily verify the results in the next Corollary.





) are not zero, and the cross derivative ∂pi
∂ρ
in
general are not −1.
Even with w = 0, final price on either side depends on the product of the
two group externality parameters. On top of that, optimal wi is a function
both group externality parameters and affects the prices on the reader side
further. Together they led to the results in Corollary 3.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper considers, one at a time, two modifications to the standard
two-sided market models. In the first modification, agents one side of the
market (advertisers) make strategic choices on the ad quality, which affects
their own utility as well as utilities of readers (i.e., agents on the other side)
joining the same platform. We find that having strategic agents leads to
12The cross partial derivatives must offset the own derivatives in a way so that the
eventual equilibrium price on either side does not depend on the group externality of
that side.
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qualitative different demand systems for the estimation of group external-
ity parameters. As a result, if the strategic agent feature is not properly
accounted for, one would obtain wrong estimates of the group externality
parameters. We also solve for equilibrium prices and find that under strate-
gic agents, equilibrium prices on both sides are lower than when agents are
passive, and they depend on group externality parameters of both sides in
general.
In the second modification, we introduce independent retailers between
platforms and readers. We find that this modification has no impact on
estimating group externality parameters, even if one is to use the wholesale
prices instead of final retail prices. However, the equilibrium prices in gen-
eral depend on group externality parameters at both sides of the market.
One particularly interesting finding is for the case where each platform is
split into two independent divisions. We recover a common equilibrium
price, charged by all divisions. This common price depends on the prod-
uct of the group externality parameters at the two sides. This is in sharp
contrast to the standard two-sided models (e.g., Armstrong (2006)) where
prices differ across the two sides, since price on each side depends only on
the group externality parameter of the other side.
While this study focuses on the effects of these two modifications on pa-
rameter estimation and equilibrium pricing, future studies can investigate
various other topics with these two modifications. These include single-
homing vs. multi-homing, price discrimination, merger impacts etc. Var-
ious studies have shown that policies that work well in one-sided markets
may not have the desirable effects when applied to two-sided markets. The
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two modifications considered in this paper will add extra complexity.
These changes in the assumption of the model can bring even more
complications when a policy is applied in a two-sided market.
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Chapter 3
Vertical Relations and Corporate Innovation
3.1 Introduction
Since knowledge is a public good, a few agents conducting research and
development (R&D) may benefit other unintentionally (Arrow, 1962). A
number of empirical works have supported this claim, indicating positive ex-
ternalities of innovation activities across countries(Coe and Helpman, 1995;
Bernstein and Mohnen, 1998; Keller, 2002), and across firms within the
same industry (Bloom et al., 2013; Badinger and Egger, 2016). The study
of knowledge spillovers is important because if one’s firms research can
positively affect other firms’ performance, then the social return on R&D
investment will be greater than the private return on R&D investment.
Therefore, from a welfare perspective, private R&D may be under-invested.
However, what we know less about is the knowledge spillovers across
industries. Industries are indeed interconnected. A product in one indus-
try may rely on the technology of various other industries. For example,
the quality of a cell phone, depends on the quality of its various compo-
nents, such as the camera, the display panel, the processor, etc., most of
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which are not manufactured by the cell phone company itself, but pur-
chased from upstream industries, which leads to an interesting research
question: how do R&D activities in upstream/downstream industries affect
downstream/upstream industries? For example, if the display panel indus-
try increase its R&D expenditures, how will it affect cell phone companies’
decisions and performance?
In this paper, I first establish the vertical relations between industries
in intermediate good markets using the industry-level input-output account
data, which contains information on intermediate good flows across indus-
tries. For each industry, I identify its upstream industries and downstream
industries. Nevertheless, most firms operate in multiple industries. There-
fore, I use each firm’s sales distribution across industries as weights to cal-
culate its weighted average upstream and downstream industries’ R&D ex-
penditures.
One novelty about this paper is that I also use patent citations to es-
tablish vertical relations between technology classes in the patent system.
Production requires not only intermediate goods, but also knowledge, and
patent citations are a good indicator of the knowledge flows (Jaffe et al.,
1993). For example, Intel cites a lot of Microsoft’s patents, because they can
improve their chips by learning from how their chips perform in Microsoft
operation systems, even though Microsoft is never a supplier of Intel. Sim-
ilarly, for each patent class, I identify its upstream classes and downstream
classes using the citation data of US patents. And for each firm, given
its patent portfolio, I also calculate the R&D expenditures of its upstream
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and downstream industries (technology classes)1, defined using the patent
citation data.
Finally, for each firm, I estimate how innovations in upstream and down-
stream industries affect its R&D expenditure and market value. Since my
independent variables are R&D expenditures in other industries, endogene-
ity isn’t a major issue. However, it might still be possible that innovations
in upstream and downstream industries are correlated to some other tech-
nology shocks. To address this potential concern, I use R&D capital costs
calculated from federal and state R&D tax credit (Wilson, 2009) as an in-
strumental variable. I discuss the validity of this instrument in Section
4.2.
Using data on a panel of 2,803 public firms in the US from 1976 to
2008, my results show that in intermediate good markets, a 1% increase
in research and development (R&D) expenditures in upstream industries
will decrease a downstream firm’s R&D expenditure by 0.729%, while a
1% increase in R&D of the downstream will reduce a upstream firm’s mar-
ket value by 0.907%. Meanwhile, in the patent system, the upstream to
downstream R&D elasticity is estimated to be 0.983, while the upstream to
downstream market value elasticity is 1.053.
To my best knowledge, all of the studies in the related literature ei-
ther focus solely on intra-industry spillovers, or don’t explicitly identify the
vertical relations between industries.2
1Industries and technology classes are not the same thing. In this paper, industries are
defined using 2002 North America Classification System (NAICS), while patent classes
are managed by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Indeed, there are some
connections between the two systems. Some efforts have been dedicated to assigning
each patent class to its NAICS concordance.
2For examples, Bloom et al. (2013) identifies the knowledge spillovers from related
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The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, instead of study-
ing technology spillovers from related industries (usually measured with
weighted average R&D stock of firms), this paper identifies the exact ver-
tical relations between industries and study how innovations in upstream
(downstream) industries affect firms in downstream (upstream). Second,
since both intermediate goods and knowledge are important inputs for pro-
duction, I distinguish two different types of vertical relations: vertical re-
lations in intermediate good markets and vertical relations in the patent
system. Third, I development a novel method to use industrial relations as
weights to calculate the R&D expenditures in upstream and downstream
for each firm.
The remainder of this paper is organized in as follows. Section 3.2
describes theoretical framework. Section 3.3 presents the data. Section 3.4
discusses the empirical strategy. Section 3.5 presents the results and Section
6 concludes.
3.2 Vertical Relations and Innovation: Channels
A large body of literature has studied vertical relations in the field of in-
dustrial organization. However, few studies focus on how innovations in
upstream/downstream industries affect firms in downstream/upstream in-
dustries. Here I highlight three main channels through which the impacts
of innovations transmit vertically across industries: the bargaining power
channel, the quality-improving R&D channel, and the cost-reducing R&D
channel. I discuss how the mechanism works for firms vertically related in
industries using a symmetric measure of technology similarity.
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intermediate good market and the patent system. In the appendix, I also
present a model of strategic R&D of vertically related firms.
3.2.1 Intermediate good markets
First, if markets for intermediate inputs are imperfectly competitive, when
there is a positive technology shock to upstream industries, it increases the
bargaining power of upstream firms when they sell intermediate inputs to
downstream firms. Assume intermediate input prices are positively corre-
lated with the bargaining power of upstream firms, then innovations in up-
stream should raise the production costs in downstream. Similarly, innova-
tions in downstream industries increase the bargaining power of downstream
firms, which enables them to lower the prices of intermediate inputs sold by
upstream firms. In short, the bargaining power channel suggests that inno-
vations in upstream/downstream industries should negatively affect market
values of firms in the corresponding downstream/upstream industries by
increasing their production costs.
Second, innovations in upstream/downstream industries might increase
the quality of final products. Assume production costs don’t go up ac-
cordingly, an increase in the quality of goods should increase the demand
for the final products, which will in turn lead to an increase in demand
for intermediate inputs. To summarize, the quality-improving R&D chan-
nel suggests that innovations in upstream/downstream should increase the
market values of downstream/upstream firms by increase the demand for
their products.
Third, if innovations reduce the costs of production in upstream, it will
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lower the price of intermediate inputs, which should subsequently benefit
the downstream firms. If innovations reduce production costs of down-
stream firms, it will increase the supply of the final products, which will
subsequently lead to an increase in quantity sold, which will increase the
demand for intermediate inputs. In short, the cost-reducing R&D channel
suggests that cost-reducing innovations in upstream/downstream industries
should benefit downstream/upstream firms.
3.2.2 The patent system
How innovations affect firms vertically related in the patent system works
a little differently, since knowledge is a public good. If upstream firms are
able to charge a license fee to downstream firms for using upstream tech-
nology, then all the three channels discussed in the previous section should
still work, because in this case knowledge is no longer a public good, simi-
lar to intermediate goods. However, if downstream firms can use upstream
technology for free, then we have a different story. First of all, the bar-
gaining channel story doesn’t hold anymore, since there are no negotiations
between upstream and downstream firms. Second, the quality-improving
channel partly holds, since downstream benefits from the improvement in
the upstream technology. However, innovations in the downstream should
have no impacts on upstream because upstream cannot benefit from the im-
provement in downstream technology, since downstream doesn’t purchase
technology from upstream. Third, the cost-reducing channel doesn’t work
because there are no transactions between upstream and downstream and




I use the Annual Input-Output (I-O) Accounts from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) for the information on the flow of intermediate goods across
industries. The data is from 1998 to 20113. Industries are defined according
to the 2002 North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS). I
calculate the sum of flows of intermediate goods at industry-pair level.
3.3.2 Patent Data
I combine three widely used patent datasets. The main patent dataset is by
Li et al. (2014). It includes all patents granted by the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) from 1975 to 2014. I supplement it with a
second dataset by Kogan et al. (2012), who calculates the private economic
values of patents of public firms in US granted from 1926 to 2010 using stock
price changes on the day the patent was granted. They also identify patent
assignees’ Compustat PERMNO ID, which will be later used to merge with
Compustat firm data.
The USPTO has a highly detailed classification schedule. Each patent
belongs to a technology class and subclass within a class. Up to this date,
there are more than 450 classes and 150,000 subclasses, which is too many
for any type of empirical analysis. Hall et al. (2001) regroup patents classi-
fications into 36 categories that are more friendly for analysis. I merge the
three patent datasets using the patent identifier number. The final com-
3The table I use is “1998-2001 Summary Make Anuual I-O Table before Redefinitions”
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bined patent dataset consists of all utility patent applied by public firms in
the US from 1976 to 2008.4
3.3.3 Firm Data
Firm data is Compustat data from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
I calculate each firm’s R&D stock with its R&D expenditure using a perpet-
ual inventory method with a 15% depreciation rate. In Section 5, I also use
alternative depreciate rates (10% and 20%) for sensitivity analysis. Firms’
market value is the sum of the values of common stock, preferred stock and
total debt net of current assets. I use the link variable by Kogan et al.
(2012), Compustat PERMNO ID, to merge the firm data with the patent
data. My final dataset is composed of 2,803 firms spanning the periods
from 1976 to 2008.
3.3.4 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics. On average, a firm in my dataset
spends $67,851/year on R&D, and we observe a large standard deviation
($395,789) relative to mean, which means R&D expenditures vary a lot
across firms and years. The average market value of a firm is $101 million.
Total assets have a mean of $732,850 and a standard deviation of $3,798,717.
4For my study, it is more interesting to look into the application date rather than
the grant date of patents, because the former is a better proxy for the time when the
firm conducts the corresponding innovation activities. On average, it takes two year for
a patent to be granted after the inventor files the application. I drop patents granted in
year 2009 and 2010 because it is very likely that a patent applied in 2009 is not granted
prior to the end of 2010, which means it may not show up in the sample.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
R&D expenditure 87,165 67.851 395.7878 0 12,183
Market value 86,589 101.283 811.9765 -78 109,746
Total assets 86,326 732.85 3,798.717 0 146,171,100
Number of employees 84,916 8.946 33.99 0 876.8
R&D expenditure, total assets are in thousands of 2009 US dollars. Market value is in
millions of 2009 US dollars. Number of employees are in thousands.
3.3.5 Vertical relations in intermediate good markets
I use the Annual Input-Output (I-O) Accounts from Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) to calculate the vertical relations between industries. I
group industries using the two-digit North America Industrial Classifica-
tion System (NAICS). There are a total of 22 industries. For each industry
s, pbuysr(t = 1, 2, ..., 22 and r 6= s)5 is the share of market values of input
industry s buys from industry r. pbuysr can range from 0 to 1, with 1
meaning industry s purchasing all the inputs from industry t and 0 mean-
ing industry s purchases nothing from industry r. Similarly, psellsr is the
share of input industry s sells to industry r (r = 1, 2, ..., 22 and r 6= s).
pbuysr and psellsr are indicators of vertical relations. For example if most
of Industry A’s purchase of intermediate goods is from industry B, pbuyAB,
which reflects that B is an upstream industry of A.
3.3.6 Vertical relations in the patent system
I use patent citations to calculate vertical relations between technology
classes. The logic behind is that I consider knowledge as an input of in-
5In general, flows of intermediate goods can happen within the same industry. How-
ever, since this paper focus on cross-industry spillovers, I require r 6= s).
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novation activities. However, it is almost impossible to actually trace the
knowledge that was used in any sort of research. A good predictor of
knowledge flows is patent citations (Jaffe et al., 1993). The US patent
laws require inventors to report any known prior arts by citing the relevant
patents. Similarly, if technology class A cites a lot from technology class B,
then B might as well be an upstream technology class of A.
There are a total of 36 technology classes in my data. For each tech-
nology class p, citingpq (q = 1, 2, ..., 36 and q 6= p) is the share of patent
citations made from technology class p to q. citingpq ranges from 0 to 1,
and greater citingpq indicates a higher technological dependence of industry
p on q. Similarly, citedpq is the share of patent citations technology class p
receives from q. citingpq and citedpq are going to be used as weights to pin
down vertical relations (discussed in Section 3.3.7).
3.3.7 Positions in intermediate good markets and the
patent system
For each firm i, I calculate its position in the intermediate good markets by
calculating sales pctis, the share of firm i’s sales in industry s. Sales data
is from Compustat segment. Similarly, for firm i’s position in the patent
system, patentip is the share of market values of patents in technology class
p.
67
3.3.8 Constructing InterUpit, InterDownit, PatentUpit, and
PatentDownit
For each firm i in year t, I first calculate the R&D expenditures in its
upstream industries and downstream industries in both intermediate good
markets and the patent system. Define indRDrt as the total R&D expen-
ditures of industry r in year t.
Inter R&D Upit = ΣsΣrsales pctispbuysrRDrt
Inter R&D Downit = ΣsΣrsales pctispsellsrRDrt
Patent R&D Upit = ΣpΣqpatentipcitingpqRDqt
Patentt R&D Downit = ΣpΣqpatentipcitedpqRDqt
In short, for each firm, its upstream/downstream R&D expenditure is
the weighted average of the weighted average of upstream/downstream in-
dustries, where the first weights are the firm’s position in intermediate good
market/the patent system, and the second weights are the vertical relations
between industries.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Equations for estimation
The general equation of my analysis takes the form:
ln(Yit) = β1ln(InterUpStkit) + β2ln(InterDownStkit) +
β3ln(PatentUpStkit) + β4ln(PatentDownStkit) + β5Xit + λi + λt + εit
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where Yit is the dependent variable of interest of firm i in year t. Xit
is a vector of controls, γi is firm fixed effect and γt is the year fixed effect.
InterUpStkit, InterDownStkit, PatentUpStkit and PatentDownStkit are
the R&D stock in the upstream industry and downstream industry, respec-
tively, both in intermediate good markets and the patent system, calculated
using a perpetual inventory method. In particular,
ln(InterUpStkit) = (1− δ)ln(InterUpStkit−1) + ln(InterUpit)
ln(InterDownStkit) = (1− δ)ln(InterDownStkit−1) + ln(InterDownit)
ln(PatentUpStkit) = (1− δ)ln(PatentUpStkit−1) + ln(PatentUpit)
ln(PatentDownStkit) = (1−δ)ln(PatentDownStkit−1)+ln(PatentDownit)
where δ = 0.15 is the depreciate rate.
In the first set of equations for estimation, I let Yit be the R&D intensity
(R&D expenditure divided by sales). Since it usually takes time for firms to
respond to shocks from other industries and formulate new R&D strategies,
I lag all the independent variables by one year in this set of equations. In
the second set of equations, I let Yit be the log of market values.
3.4.2 Instrumental variable approach
A potential of this estimation technique is that it might be susceptible
to endogenous R&D shocks. If new research opportunities arise, it may
lead to an increase in focal firm’s R&D and related industries’ R&D. To
address this issue, I use the costs of R&D capital calculated from federal
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and state R&D tax credit (Wilson, 2009) as instruments. One might be
concerned that R&D tax credit policy may also be endogenous to innovation
shocks. However, the existing literature agrees that there is no evidence that
economic conditions predicted R&D policy. In my estimation, I use costs of
R&D capital to predict each firm’s R&D expenditure, and use the predicted
R&D expenditures to construct InterUpit, InterDownit, PatentUpit, and
PatentDownit.
For R&D tax credit to be a valid instrument, it has to satisfy two re-
quirements: 1) the instrument must be correlated with the endogenous ex-
planatory variable. 2) the instrument might be exogenous. I discuss them
separately here.
The F-statistic of the first stage regression of an instrumental variable
approach is commonly used to test the relevance of the instrument. A rule
of thumb is that the F-statistic should be larger than 10. In Table 3.2, I
present the first stage result. The F-statistic is 15.345.
This is no statistical tool to test the exogeneity of an instrument. Here I
discuss it based on a survey of the literature. Studies find evidence that state
R&D tax credit policies are partly driven by some macroeconomic condi-
tions, but local economic variables seem to be not important (Chirinko and
Wilson, 2008). This is partly because there are randomly long time delays
in passing state R&D tax credit policies and R&D tax credits are generally
small so that they are usually not affected by state budget conditions.
70
Table 3.2: First stage regression
Variable (1)





Number of observations 21,299
Standard errors in parentheses.* (p < 0.05),
** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001). The depen-
dent variable is R&D expenditures at firm-
year level. Firm fixed effects and year fixed
effects are used. Standard errors are clus-
tered at firm level.
3.5 Results
In Table 3.3, I present results of the strategic R&D estimation, where the
dependent variable is the log of R&D intensity and R&D intensity is calcu-
lated by dividing R&D expenditure by sales. In Column (1), I don’t control
for industrial sales. Results show that innovations in downstream industries
in intermediate good market are negatively correlated with a downstream
firm’s R&D expenditure. In the patent system, R&D activities in upstream
are positively associated with a downstream firm’s R&D, while downstream
industries’ R&D expenditures are negatively correlated with an upstream
firm’s R&D.
In Column (2), I additionally control for industrial sales. The signs of
coefficients on ln(InterDown), ln(PatentUp) and ln(PatentDown) don’t
change, but their magnitudes increase a little bit. The coefficient on ln(InterUp)
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Table 3.3: Strategic R&D estimation
Variable (1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS IV
ln(InterUp) -0.146 -0.363* -0.729***
(0.161) (0.195) (0.153)
ln(InterDown) -0.402** -0.551*** 0.018
(0.176) (0.196) (0.131)
ln(PatentUp) 0.841*** 1.373*** 0.983***
(0.191) (0.234) (0.166)




Number of observations 26,280 21,299 21,299
Standard errors in parentheses.* (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001).
The dependent variable is R&D intensity (R&D expenditure/Sales) at firm-
year level. Column (2) and (3) include industrial sales as a control variable.
Column (3) also uses costs of R&D capital (calculated from federal and
state R&D tax credit) as an instrument. Standard errors are clustered at
firm level.
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is negative and becomes marginally significant at 10% level.
Column (3) displays the instrumental variable approach results. It shows
that in intermediate good markets, a 1% increase in R&D expenditures in
upstream industries will decrease a downstream firm’s R&D expenditures
by 0.729%. Meanwhile, in the patent system, a 1% increase in R&D ex-
penditures in upstream raises a downstream firm’s R&D expenditure by
0.983%, and on the reverse side, a 1% increase in R&D expenditures in
downstream lowers an upstream firm’s R&D by 0.433%.
Table 3.4 presents results where the dependent variable is the log of
market values of firms. In Column (1), I don’t control for industrial sales,
while in Column (2) I additionally include industrial sales as an independent
variable. Column (3) is the instrumental variable approach. We can see
that the coefficient on ln(InterUp) is insignificant in all columns. The
coefficient on ln(InterDown are consistently negative and significant in
all specifications. In general, a 1% increase in R&D investment in the
intermediate good downstream industries lead to a -0.907% decrease in an
upstream firm’s market value. In the patent system, a 1% increase in R&D
investment in the technology upstream industries lead to a 1.053% increase
in the market value of a downstream firm. Note that the instrumental
variable approach also makes the coefficient on ln(PatentDown) marginally
significant.
3.5.1 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section I fist allow alternative depreciation rates. In Table 3.5 and
3.6, I use δ = 0.1 and δ = 0.2, where 3.5 presents results with log R&D
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Table 3.4: Market value equation
Variable (1) (2) (3)
ln(InterUp) -0.306 -0.353 -0.263
(0.245) (0.256) (0.243)
ln(InterDown) -0.474* -0.882*** -0.907***
(0.267) (0.287) (0.212)
ln(PatentUp) 0.849*** 1.443*** 1.053***
(0.322) (0.349) (0.275)
ln(PatentDown) 0.097 0.081 0.350*
(0.217) (0.249) (0.200)
Number of observations 28,546 23,327 23,327
Standard errors in parentheses.* (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001).
The dependent variable is market value at firm-year level. Column (2) and
(3) include industrial sales as a control variable. Column (3) also uses costs
of R&D capital (calculated from federal and state R&D tax credit) as an
instrument. Standard errors are clustered at firm level.
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as the dependent variable and 3.6 presents results with log market value
as the dependent variable. To make it easy for comparison, Column (1) of
Table 3.5 is identical to column (3) of Table 3.3 and Column (1) of Table
3.6 is the same as Column (3) of Table 3.4. We can see that using different
depreciation rates of doesn’t change the sign of the coefficients. My results
are robust to different depreciation rates.
Table 3.5: Sensitivity analysis: alternative depreciation rate (strategic
R&D)
Depreciate rate 15% 20% 10%
Variable (1) (2) (3)
ln(InterUp) -0.729*** -0.683*** -0.774***
(0.153) (0.145) (0.162)
ln(InterDown) 0.018 0.007 0.026
(0.131) (0.125) (0.138)
ln(PatentUp) 0.983*** 0.931*** 1.045***
(0.166) (0.158) (0.176)
ln(PatentDown) -0.433*** -0.421*** -0.454***
(0.144) (0.136) (0.153)
Number of observations 21,299 21,299 21,299
Standard errors in parentheses.* (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001).
The dependent variable is R&D expenditures at firm-year level. Each col-
umn uses a different depreciate rate to calculate R&D stocks in upstream
and downstream industries. All columns control for industrial sales and also
use costs of R&D capital (calculated from federal and state R&D tax credit)
as instruments. Standard errors are clustered at firm level.
All the previous results use the total R&D expenditures in the up-
stream/downstream industries. One potential concern is that the size of
the upstream/downstream industries might affect downstream/upstream
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Table 3.6: Sensitivity analysis: alternative depreciation rate (market value)
Depreciate rate 15% 20% 10%
Variable (1) (2) (3)
ln(InterUp) -0.263 -0.253 -0.270
(0.243) (0.229) (0.162)
ln(InterDown) -0.907*** -0.870*** -0.954***
(0.212) (0.203) (0.223)
ln(PatentUp) 1.053*** 1.021*** 1.098***
(0.275) (0.260) (0.294)
ln(PatentDown) 0.349* 0.348* 0.350*
(0.200) (0.191) (0.213)
Number of observations 23,327 23,327 23,327
Standard errors in parentheses.* (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001).
The dependent variable is market values at firm-year level. Each column
uses a different depreciate rate to calculate R&D stocks in upstream and
downstream industries. All columns control for industrial sales and also use
costs of R&D capital (calculated from federal and state R&D tax credit) as
instruments. Standard errors are clustered at firm level.
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firms. In this section, I address this issue by using the average R&D expen-
ditures (over firms) in upstream/downstream industries. Table 3.7 presents
the results. The dependent variable in Column (1) and (2) is log of R&D
intensity (R&D expenditure/Sales) at firm-year level, and in Column (3)
and (4) the dependent variable is log of market value. All columns include
industrial sales as a control variable, and use costs of R&D capital (cal-
culated from federal and state R&D tax credit) as an instrument.Column
(2) and (4) use average R&D expenditures in the upstream/downstream
industries. If we compare the results in this table with those in Table 3.3
and Table 3.4, we can see the magnitudes and significance of the coefficients
don’t change much.
3.6 Conclusion
A firm’s performance is not only affected by its own R&D, but also by
other firms’ research efforts. Although many studies have found empirical
evidence that technology spills over across countries and within industries,
few studies focus on inter-industrial spillovers. This paper studies how in-
novations transmit vertically across industries. I first develop a method
to establish vertical relations between industries using sales data in inter-
mediate good markets and patent citation data. Then given each firm’s
position in intermediate good markets and the patent system, I calculate
its upstream and downstream industries’ R&D expenditures.
Using data on 2,803 public firms in the US from 1976 to 2008, I esti-
mate the impacts of innovations in the upstream/downstream industries on
downstream/upstream firms. To deal with potential endogeneity problems,
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Table 3.7: Average industrial R&D expenditures
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(InterUp) -0.729*** -0.844*** -0.263 0.533*
(0.153) (0.175) (0.243) (0.278)
ln(InterDown) 0.018 -0.500*** -0.907*** -1.550***
(0.131) (0.182) (0.212) (0.309)
ln(PatentUp) 0.983*** 1.503*** 1.053*** 1.010***
(0.166) (0.234) (0.275) (0.361)
ln(PatentDown) -0.433*** -0.335* 0.350* 0.251
(0.144) (0.181) (0.200) (0.266)
Number of observations 21,299 21,299 23,327 23,327
Standard errors in parentheses.* (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001). The dependent
variable in column (1) and (2) is log of R&D intensity (R&D expenditure/Sales) at firm-year
level, and in column (3) and (4) the dependent variable is log of market value. All columns
include industrial sales as a control variable, and use costs of R&D capital (calculated from
federal and state R&D tax credit) as an instrument.Column (1) and (3) use total R&D
expenditure in the upstream/downstream industries. Column (2) and (4) use average R&D
expenditures in the upstream/downstream industries. Standard errors are clustered at firm
level.
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I use costs of R&D capital calculated from state R&D tax credit as an in-
strumental variable. My results show that in intermediate good markets, a
1% increase in research and development (R&D) expenditures in upstream
industries will decrease a downstream firm’s R&D expenditure by 0.729%,
while a 1% increase in R&D of the downstream will reduce a upstream
firm’s market value by 0.907%. Meanwhile, in the patent system, the up-
stream to downstream R&D and market value elasticities are estimated to
be 0.983 and 1.053.
Future research should first focus on the theoretical foundations of ver-
tical spillovers. In this paper, I highlighted three possible channels through
which technology could transmit vertically across industries, but we still
need a complete model to answer these questions. Second, due to con-
straint of data, I am unable to explore how market structures might play
a role in vertical spillovers. It could be interesting to see how technology
spillovers depend on the type of the market.
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Appendices
A Calculating driving time
I use the Stata command georoute written by Weber et al. (2016). It utilizes
HERE’s map services. To acquire the driving time between two locations,
one can use either addresses or coordinates of the two points. While obtain-
ing airport addresses is not an issue, it is not straightforward to assign an
address or a coordinate to an MSA. I use the average coordinates weighted
by number of patents to calculate the ”coordinate” for an MSA. For ex-
ample, suppose MSA j has 7 patents in my sample, and 4 of them are
applied at the coordinate (lat1, lon1) and 3 are applied at (lat2, lon2), then
the coordinate of MSA i is ((4lat1 + 3lat2)/7, (4lon1 + 3lon2)/7).
B Reductions in travel time as a treatment
I consider reductions in travel time as treatments. Specifically, I divide the
treatments into several groups, each corresponding to a certain amount of
travel time reduction. trtijt = (trt0 15ijt, trt15 30ijt, trt30 60ijt, trt60 120ijt, trt 120ijt).
Each element of the vector equals one if the reduction falls in its range. For
example, trt30 60ijt = 1 if the reduction is between 30 and 60 minutes, and
trt 120ijt = 1 if travel time is reduced by more than 120 minutes.
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In many cases, an airline exits a market shortly after its entry once it
finds the market is not profitable. It is hard for business travelers to benefit
from those temporary travel time reductions. To make sure the reduction
in travel time is stable, I first construct two variable.
atra beforeijt = (travelijt+travelij,t−1+travelij,t−2+travelij,t−3+travelij,t−4)/5
atra afterijt = (travelijt+travelij,t+1+travelij,t+2+travelij,t+3+travelij,t+4)/5
atra beforeijt is the five-year average travel time prior to year t and
atra afterijt is the five-year average travel time after year t. Each element
of trtijt equals 1 if travelijt is reduced by certain amount compared to
travelij,t−1, and atra afterijt is reduced by certain amount compared to
atra beforeij,t−1. Finally, trtijt = 1 if trtij,t−1 = 1.
C Proof of Chapter 2 Proposition 2
Since we have a continuum of agents of mass 1 on either side, we have





j, i = 1, 2, j = a, r. Then equations (2.9) and (2.11)
also provide the expressions for marginal advertiser and marginal reader.









2 − (N r2 )




+ γ(Na1 −Na2 )− γ · ρ · (N r1 ·Na1 −N r2 ·Na2 )− (p1 − p2).
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Substituting the xj expressions into the following
N j1 = x
j, N j2 = 1− xj, j = a, r,




− γ(ρ+ 2)(a1 − a2) + ρ(ρ+ 2)(p1 − p2)






γ(ρ− 2)(a1 − a2)− (p1 − p2)
γρ3 − 3γρ+ 1
.
Platform i’s problem is :
max
pi,ai
πi = pi ·N ri + ai ·Nai .






ρ(γ − ρ), ai =
1
2
− γ + 1
2
ργ,













ρ2 i = 1, 2.

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D Proof of Chapter 2 Proposition 3
(i) Equilibrium prices at the benchmark model (with superscript ’b’) and













ρ(γ − ρ), asi =
1
2
− γ + 1
2
ργ.
The difference pbi − psi = −12ρ(γ − ρ) > 0 since γ is negative and ρ is
positive. Similarly, abi − asi = −12ργ > 0. Combined, equilibrium prices on
both sides are lower under strategic agents relative to the benchmark case.
(ii) With lower prices on both sides, advertisers and readers must be
better off at the cost of platforms. 
E Proof of Chapter 2 Proposition 4
There is no change on the final agents relative to the benchmark case.











2ρ(p1 − p2) + (a1 − a2)
4γρ− 1




form (manufacturer) i’s profit. The profit maximization problems are
max
p1
πret1 = (p1 − w1) · nr1, max
p2
πret2 = (p2 − w2) · (1− nr1),
max
a1
πman1 = w1 · nr1 + a1 · na1, max
a2
πman2 = w2 · (1− nr1) + a2 · (1− na1).
Solving the FOCs, we can obtain the optimal retail prices as functions
of w1 and w2.
6 We also verify that
p1 − p2 = −
(8γ2 + 3)(w1 − w2)
16γρ− 9
.




πman1 = w1 · nr + a1 · na,
max
w2
πman2 = w2 · (1− nr) + a2 · (1− na).
Taking derivatives and then imposing symmetry (w1 = w2), we can
obtain
w1 = w2 =
9− 4ρ− 6γ − 16ργ
16γ2 + 6
.
Substituting the wholesale prices into retail prices, we have
pi =




























− 2 · ρ · γ
)
.




F A model of strategic R&D and vertical relations
I develop a theoretical framework for strategic R&D of vertically related
firms. Firms U1, U2, ..., UN are in the upstream and firms D1, D2, ...DM are
in the downstream. For simplicity, I assume M = N and each downstream
firm Di has only one supplier Ui. The latter can be true when the cost of
switching to another supplier is extremely high.
There are three stages of game. In the first stage, both upstream and
downstream firms engage in R&D activities that will affect the quality of
products and marginal cost of production. In the second stage, the up-
stream firm Ui produces an input at marginal cost cU , and sells it to the
downstream firm Di at price w. In the third stage, downstream firm Di use
to input and produce the final product at marginal cost cD and sell the final
product to consumers at price p. Suppose the demand function is given by
D = α + βsU + sD − p, where sU and sD are the quality of products sold
by the upstream firm and downstream firm, respectively, and β > 0, then
the profit function for firm Di in the third stage is
πD = (p− w − cD)(α + βsU + sD − p).




(α + βsU + sD + w + cD) (1)
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Anticipating p, the profit function for firm Ui in the second stage is
πU = (w − cU)(α + βsU + sD − p) (2)




(α + βsU + sD − cD + cU) (3)




(α + βsU) +
1
4
(cD + cU) (4)
The optimal choice of w∗ and p∗ are functions of quality of products and
marginal cost of production, which are determined by R&D in the first








(α + βsU + sD − cD − cU)2 (6)
In the next section, I will show how firm Ui(orDi) will respond when
there is an exogenous increase in firm D′i(orU
′
i) R&D expenditures in two
different cases: 1) R&D increases quality (s); 2) R&D reduces marginal cost
(c).
Suppose R&D improve product quality for both upstream and down-
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(α + βsU + sD − cD − cU)2 − rD (7)
where rD stands for the R&D spending of the downstream firm. Since
R&D is quality-improving, let sU = φ(rU) and sD = λ(rD) and assume
φ
′
(·) > 0, λ′(·) > 0, φ”(·) < 0, and λ”(·) < 0. The concave feature of
the functions ensure that there is diminishing marginal return on quality-
improving R&D. First order condition yields
1
8
(α + βφ(rU) + λ(rD)− cD − cU)λ
′
(rD)− 1 = 0 (8)



















2 are always positive, the sign of ∂r∗D/∂rU is


















(α + βsU + sD − cD − cU)2 − rU (10)
7Another type of R&D is cost-reducing. In the Appendix I show it generates similar
results
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2 > 0, and negative when −φ′′(rU)∆− β(φ
′
(rU))
2 < 0
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